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Jordan has been a particularly interesting location to observe the
trends, patterns and dynamics of long-term emigration from Iraq over
the last period of Baathist rule. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the fall
of Saddam Hussein, circulation between Iraq and all its other neigh-
bours officially stopped periodically, whereas the flow of people,
goods and capital never ceased across the border with Jordan, which
remained Iraq’s primary economic partner. The Jordanian authorities
granted Iraqis almost unconditional entry; they allowed Iraqi interna-
tional businessmen and cross border traders to skirt the embargo by
using Amman as a base, tolerated the presence of the Iraqi intelligence
services, and even admitted Iraqi opponents as long as they were not
active politically. While airports in Iraq were closed due to the embar-
go, Jordan was the gateway to the outside
world—not only for the Iraqi business and po-
litical elite who were travelling internationally,
but also for the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
exiles who left the Middle East over that peri-
od. 
In Jordan ‘refugee’ is an extremely loaded
term, and a legal, social and political category
that is almost exclusively the preserve of
Palestinians. Neither in the law, nor in collec-
tive representations is there space to consider
the Iraqis as refugees, and very few Jordanian
civil society structures have undertaken assis-
tance programmes for this group. The country
is party to no international legal instrument
relating to non-Palestinian refugees and has
devised no domestic framework for asylum
granting. It is the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) who is locally charged with
the task of determining refugee status and the
subsequent resettlement of refugees to a third country, usually in the
West. In this context, what have been the large Iraqi community mem-
bers’ livelihood strategies in Jordan, and how has the Jordanian non-
policy towards them affected their migration trends over the last 12
years? 
Patterns of the 1990s
The number of Iraqis who have come to Jordan since 1991 and not
returned to Iraq, either staying in the Hashimite Kingdom or transiting
it, could be as high as 1,5 million. Before 1996, there were roughly
100,000 Iraqi residents in Jordan; most recently, there were about
350,000. Just before the April 2003 US and British military intervention
only 30,000 of them were legally permanent residents, while another
10,000 to 15,000 were temporary circular migrants. This left over
300,000 Iraqi exiles, 5,000 to 7,000 of whom were either asylum seekers
or refugees under the mandate of the UNHCR. The rest had mostly
overstayed their 6-month temporary visit permits and were remaining
clandestinely. Since the Gulf War, this group has been in constant re-
composition. New individuals keep arriving from Iraq, while others
leave Jordan to immigrate to countries further afield. There is, howev-
er, a stable core of legal and long-term illegal residents, the latter hav-
ing found the connections and protection that allow them to eke out a
living in the informal sectors of the economy and to avoid expulsion
back to Iraq.
During the early 1990s, mass emigration from Iraq took place mainly in
the direction of Iran, in response to the repression that followed the so-
called Shiite and Kurdish uprisings of 1991. Iran generally granted
Iraqis refugee status in one form or another, if not always the prospects
of local integration.1 Those who came to Amman with a view to staying
long-term consciously chose Jordan over Iran, a land with which they
had no political and often no religious affinity. Their decision to leave
mostly stemmed from a serious feeling of insecurity: a dramatic drop in
their standard of living ensuing from the deteriorating economic situa-
tion, sometimes coupled with harassment by the authorities. These
emigrants were among the most educated, starting the brain drain the
regime feared, and against which disincentive measures were soon
adopted: passport and exit fees were raised and family members left
behind were often harassed. These high costs reinforced the self-selec-
tive effects of migration by penalizing the less well off or those who
were unable to mobilize cross border and/or transnational social net-
works. 
As a result, one category of migrants came to Jordan with the aim of
activating family reunification schemes with the help of foreign em-
bassies and the office of the UNHCR in Amman. Canada, Australia and
the USA initially granted a number of immigration visas, as sponsor-
ship schemes for humanitarian refugees existed in most of these coun-
tries. All these options favoured those who already had close relatives
in Western countries, or who were members of communities long-es-
tablished in such countries and who could use communal associations
as sponsors. This was especially widespread among members of the
various Christian denominations.
Another important group was that of professionals who were initially
in demand in Jordan. Engineers, doctors, university professors and
artists were generally able to find employment in Amman, and were
granted residency and work permits. At a time when they could im-
prove their situation by integrating into the existing Jordanian job
market, that was the option many selected over attempting a dubious
legal or clandestine migration to a Western country, even when con-
sidering the good chances of being granted refugee status. Only a mar-
ginal number of exiles approached the Amman office of the UNHCR.
Most feared its infiltration by the Iraqi intelligence, which would mean
insecurity for those left behind. But as early as 1994 it had become al-
most impossible to find legal employment in Jordan and most Western
countries had stopped granting immigration visas, with many having
adopted more restrictive measures on family reunification. Until 1998
very limited possibilities for leaving Jordan remained; one could nego-
tiate a work contract with Yemen, Libya or Sudan which were short on
professionals, an option that tended to appeal more to Sunnis than to
Shiites or Christians. For the majority of Iraqi exiles in Jordan the only
alternative to staying was to attempt clandestine migration, mainly to
Western Europe. To meet this demand, a market for services to skirt
border control policies developed in Amman, the high costs again
favouring those who could access financial capital.2
Migration networks
Social networks were called upon to help meet the costs of both life
in Jordan and of clandestine migration. Iraqi Christians approached
the many well-established churches in Jordan. Religious solidarity was
mobilized to find housing, work, to receive assistance, to access free
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medical services, or to register children in Christian schools. Jordanian
parish priests interceded to prevent deportation back to Iraq, and to
support visa applications or refugee claims. According to their indi-
vidual inclinations and the available social identities, other migrants
tried to reach out to comrades in the Jordanian Communist Party, to
professional associations, to fellow artists, to religious based Sunni
charities, or to the few notables of Iraqi origin whose families had be-
come well established in Jordan after the 1958 overthrow of the
Hashimite monarchy in Baghdad. These relations provided Iraqis lo-
cally unconnected by kinship ties with an entry into the patron-client
structure that is one of the driving forces of Jordanian society and
through which work and housing could be found. To meet the costs of
long-distance emigration, individuals indebted themselves to rela-
tives or close friends scattered all over the world. When the move was
planned in advance, part or all of the costs were gathered in Iraq, usu-
ally by selling properties. This entailed decision-making involving the
whole household, and often even an extended family. Strategic choic-
es were made as to which country to aim for, who should go first, and
who should stay in custody of properties. The subsequent reunion of
all family members was also carefully planned. Originally, exile mi-
grants to Jordan were mostly working-age males. But as their stays in
Jordan were prolonged, many wives joined their husbands together
with their children. Later, women came whose husbands were already
in the West and who had either asked for family reunification, or had
gathered enough money to pay for the rest of the family’s clandestine
journey. 
Shiite exiles
The year 1996 marked a turning point in the patterns of Iraqi exile mi-
gration to Jordan. In Iraq, a major wave of repression hit the Shiite reli-
gious establishment and any individuals who were suspected of being
pro-Iranian. Thousands who would have turned to Iran for asylum were
willing to flee Iraq. But crossing into the Islamic Republic had become
extremely dangerous now that the state-sponsored drainage of the
Southern Marches—the traditional passageway of refugees into Iran—
was almost complete and the border area heavily mined. Prospective
migrants thus looked to Jordan, albeit aware that they would not be re-
ceived as refugees, and that their sectarian affiliation and pro-Iranian
inclinations would be problematic. Self-asserting Shiites were very
much alien to Sunni or Christian Jordanians. No provisions in Jordanian
law allowed for the development of Shiite communal institutions such
as mosques; the Iranian Revolution was a model for no local political
current, and official relations with Iran were cold if not openly tense.
Because of the usual financial constraints, those Iraqi Shiites who fi-
nally made it to Jordan were once again members of the educated
middle class. They rarely had high financial assets, but expected their
educational and professional capital to be negotiable on the official
Jordanian job market. They soon found that the professional sectors
were saturated, and that, without relations on which to rely, it was ex-
tremely difficult to find even petty jobs, cheap and decent housing,
and to access a number of basic services. Confronted with what they
saw as unacceptable living conditions, the most well off did not stay
long in Jordan. They were ready to pay to reach the UK, which hosted
the largest Iraqi exile community in the West, and where Shiite insti-
tutions were well developed. The rest of these migrants, having ex-
hausted their savings on their exit and on their stay in Jordan within a
few months, experienced a sharp social downfall and what they
sensed as religious discrimination. Devoid of legal rights, including
those of practising their religion collectively or of getting married, di-
vorced or buried according to their rite, many now also lived well
below the poverty line in extremely poor housing and unsanitary con-
ditions, when they had once been among the intellectual elite of their
communities. They thus deeply resented having to live side by side
the lowest strata of Jordanian society. Unable to work legally, many
had to compete with unskilled Egyptians on the informal labour mar-
ket. Within a couple of years, a process similar to the one experienced
by the earlier wave of Iraqi exiles took place. Wives and children
joined men and specialized travel agents offered their services from
Amman to Western countries. 
The difference this time around was that pioneer Iraqi Shiites had been
being accepted legally in North America, Northern Europe and Aus-
tralia as resettled refugees since 1992. So those unsatisfied with their
lot in Jordan could now contact their kin who had stable legal status
and better economic conditions abroad. The latter thus sent funds to
the former, and a chain migration and worldwide dispersal of Iraqi Shi-
ites was then fuelled; this was in contrast to the previous waves of Shi-
ite migrants that had largely been absorbed into Iran. 
Iraqi Shiites also managed to locally develop their own support net-
works based on sectarian ties, although these groups never fully recre-
ated a structured community. Small-scale religious gatherings regular-
ly took place, scattered across various neighbourhoods in Amman,
each headed by a member of the clergy, often a young theology stu-
dent able to access resources within the worldwide Shiite community.
On a spiritual level, these gatherings gave a religious sense to mem-
bers’ collective experiences as marginalized exiles. On a practical level,
they allowed for the exchange of information regarding the situation
in Iraq, livelihood opportunities in Jordan, and the possibility of further
emigration. Finally, they acted as financial support networks to cover
the costs of migration to the West, generally to the UK, which in some
cases served as a last step before finally reaching Iran. 
The recent regime change in Iraq has prompted a new category of
Iraqis to envision their futures abroad, those belonging to the layer of
the middle and upper middle class that was associated with the previ-
ous regime and which has capital. Jordan is again the main regional
pole of this emigration, from where Western Europe—if not post-9/11
North America—remains accessible, and where work contracts can be
negotiated again with Libya and Yemen to replace those Iraqis who
now think of returning. A limited trend of return migration is already
perceptible, in which Jordan is the last step before getting back to Iraq
to explore the possibilities of long-term return or the mere re-estab-
lishment of economic or social ties. Now that Iraqi migration has had
ample time to gain a transnational dimension, it is likely that chain mi-
gration through Jordan will continue until families are reconstituted
away from the Middle East, or until families reverse the direction of
their migration and reunite within Iraq. 
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